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ABSTRACT

Marriage is a local arrangement with internationaleffects.
Throughout the Western world, a marriage recognized as valid
by the parties' home country is usually considered valid and
binding in any other country. This recognition carries
substantialbenefits. In sharp contrast, unwed couples and some
married couples, namely same-sex couples, are denied these
benefits due to lack of (sufficient) inter-state and international
recognition of their relationships, making their relationships
unstable at best. This Article discusses the cross-border
recognition of such relationships-or lack thereof-and its
effects, and it suggests a way to better the situation using
private law tools, thus avoiding much of the public debate on
the matter.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine case 1: Odysseus married Penelope in their homeland
Greece, in a marriage valid under Greek law. Later, they moved to
Troy. According to the norm embodied in the conflict of laws rules
regarding marriage, Troy would recognize the validity of this
marriage regardless of the terms of marriage in Trojan law. That is
because the ceremony is valid according to the law of the country
where it was preformed, and the parties are considered to have
marital capacity according to the law of their home country. The
choice of law rules regarding this issue, though structured for the
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most part by each country independently, are similar throughout the
world. Each states the same basic norm that when a couple that is
eligible to marry marries in a ceremony valid in the country where
the marriage is preformed, other countries should recognize this
marriage as valid.' This would be the case even if the marriage was
performed in a manner unacceptable in Trojan law or between parties
unfit to marry according to that law, out of respect for Greece's
autonomy and control over its people. So, wherever Odysseus may go,
his marriage to Penelope remains valid.
Now imagine a few alternative stories: Max and Helena are
registered as civil partners in the Netherlands. They move to
Germany in order to take care of Max's sick mother. While in
Germany they break up. Helena attempts to formally resolve their
relationship only to find out that under German law civil
partnerships are only available to same-sex couples, thus their
relationship is not recognized, leaving Max free to go without any
formal closure. Similarly, Arthur and Oliver, registered as civil
partners in England, follow their dream and move to Greece. While in
Greece, their relationship deteriorates to the point that Arthur moves
out, taking all the money from the joint bank account and moving it
to his own Greek bank account, leaving Oliver stranded. Oliver sues,
asking that the bank be ordered to freeze the money based on it being
"marital" property only to find out that their relationship, formal and
valid in England, would not be recognized in Greece, which bars
same-sex couples from entering civil partnerships. Lastly, Sean and
Fiona are cohabiting under Irish law. While en route to vacation in
New Zealand their airplane crashes in Austria. They both survive,
but Fiona is badly injured. Sean tries to inform the doctors of Fiona's
medical care preferences but is told that under Austrian law he is
considered a stranger, as that law does not recognize their
relationship, and the doctors would be deciding for Fiona until
someone in her immediate family could be reached.
In all those cases, the country of destination would, at best, reevaluate the relationship and any rights derived from it according to
its domestic law. All these couples would be unable to enjoy the legal
consequences of their relationships that are given to them according
to the law of their country of origin. In some such cases, spouses may
be fully relieved of their spousal duties and stripped of their rights by
crossing a border, even though their personal law remain unchanged.
The difference between the cross-border regulation of marriages
and alternative spousal relationships (ASRs) is a result of the fact

1.
Except for the United States, where it is generally enough that the
marriage was valid by the law having "the most significant relationship to the spouses
and the marriage" or that of the place where it was performed, the law of the parties'
home country is not consulted. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283
(1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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that there are not-and never have been-any systematic conflicts
rules regarding ASRs. Such relationships were previously unknown
to law or banned by it. Now common and allowed (for the most part),
those relationships remain unregulated on the international level.
Many countries simply do not have any rules regarding the treatment
of such relationships. Those that do, offer insufficient solutions,
particularly due to the massive diversity of ASRs. This Article aims to
better this situation by suggesting an appropriate cross-border
regulation mechanism for such relationships in the Western world. 2
This Article starts with defining ASRs and their importance.
Part II of this Article sets the context of the discussion by describing
three categories of ASRs, namely "marriage, but," "marriage like,"
and "marriage alternative." The part discusses the social importance
of ASRs, which justifies an effort for bettering the legal protection
given to these relationships. Part III of this Article stresses the
problem of ASRs in transition. It discusses the different aspects of
ASRs and their current cross-border protection. This part further
demonstrates the conceptual and practical problem by comparing
ASRs to the paradigmatic spousal relationship, marriage, and the
status-based thinking guiding its cross-border regulation. It explains
why a status-solution would not be appropriate for ASRs. This Article
then moves to suggesting a solution. Part IV lays out the challenges
of ASR choice of law, suggesting contractual thinking as an
appropriate solution for the problem. Lastly, in Part V this solution is
applied to different cases of ASRs and to states with different
approaches as a way to explore the scope of the proposed solution.

II. ASRS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE

A. Defining ASRs: Some Alternatives for the Regulation of ASRs
The twentieth century has brought with it many changes in the
way families are regulated: the concept of family has gained
flexibility, containing structures once excluded, such as cohabiting
unwed couples and same-sex couples. 3 Legal systems have tried to

2.
While non-Western countries are not directly discussed here, they are not
left out of the discussion completely. Some such countries show some lenience towards
ASRs and so may be willing to consider the suggested solution. Others manifestly
oppose such relationships, so they would have a valid public policy objection.
3.
For a comprehensive discussion of these changes, see Masha Antokolskaia,
Comparative Family Law: Moving with the Times?, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A
HANDBOOK 241, 241-47, 253-56 (Esin Orticil & David Nelken eds., 2007) [hereinafter
Antokolskaia, Moving With Time]; MASHA ANTOKOLSKAIA, HARMONISATION OF FAMILY
LAW IN EUROPE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 273-312 (2006) (Eur. Family Law Ser. No.
13, 2006). For a discussion on the theoretical underpinnings of these changes, see id. at
261-72.
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address this situation by creating all sorts of regulating structures for
such relationships. 4 These structures, though created by different
legal systems, each addressing its own legal issues and social needs,
can all be loosely clustered into groups. For the purposes of the
discussion in this Article, it is suggested to think of these
relationships as each belonging to one of three general types. The
first, "marriage, but," refers mainly 5 to same-sex couples getting
legally and formally married in the same manner and procedure as
heterosexual couples but producing a different outcome when it comes
to mobility, as the following discussion will demonstrate. The second
type, "marriage-like," refers to spouses regulating their affairs
through a formal legal procedure resulting in relationships similar,
but not identical, to marriage, both in name and in outcomes. The
third type could be described as a "marriage alternative." This type of
relationship, though legally binding and sometimes entailing
outcomes very similar to those of marriage, lacks the clear formal
procedure for creation and dissolution that the other types have.
Spouses in such relationships sometimes actively and knowingly (if
not intentionally) avoid the formalities of marriage and marriage-like
relationships. To better explain the different mechanisms, examples
are in order.
1.

"Marriage, But"

The best known "marriage, but" arrangement is that of same-sex
marriage in the United States. Some states in the United States
allow couples of the same sex to marry, considering the access to
marriage a matter of civil rights and its denial problematic on the
grounds of equality. 6 Other states strongly oppose such marriages,

considering them an abomination both to God and to the concept of
marriage. 7 These marriages, when contracted in a state allowing
them, are created in the same manner as all other marriages in the

4.
For a comparative survey, see generally LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert

Wintemute

& Mads

Andenss eds., 2001); LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX

RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPE: NATIONAL, CROSS-BORDER AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

(Katharina Boele-Woelki & Angelika Fuchs eds., Eur. Family Law Ser. No. 32, 2d ed.
2012); Katharina Boele-Woelki, The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships
Within the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1949 (2007-2008).
5.
Polygamy may also be included in this group, though modern approaches
are much more accepting towards it. See infra note 125.
6.
See, e.g., Julia Halloran McLaughlin, DOMA and the Constitutional
Coming Out of Same-Sex Marriage, 24 WIs. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 145, 172-84 (2009)
(discussing the constitutional arguments underlying the recognition of same-sex
marriages).

7.
For a detailed presentation of such arguments, see, for example, Michael
Mello, For Today, I'm Gay: The Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont,
25 VT. L. REV. 149, 184-208 (2000).
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state and are considered as valid as any other marriage. The Federal
legislation has its own stand on the recognition of marriage, both as a
legislator and as a coordinating mechanism between the states. Until
recently, the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 8 stated that as
far as the Federal government is concerned, "the word 'marriage'
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."9 So, marriage was not
always simply marriage: some marriages entered into according to
state legislation and valid in that state would not receive the Federal
recognition and benefits given to other marriages, solely on the
grounds of the parties' sex. This clause was recently invalidated by
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the case of Ms. Windsor,1 0 which
stated that this clause undermines same-sex marriages by deeming
them unworthy of recognition and placing them "in an unstable
position of being in a second-tier marriage."
However, DOMA has a second part, still valid to this day:
No State ... shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under
the laws of such other State . . ., or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.12

According to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution,1 3 U.S. states are expected to mutually recognize each
other's public acts, records, and judicial proceedings. Some argue that
this clause requires that when a state is confronted with a finalized
legal action of another state, such as a valid marriage certificate, the
first state should recognize 1 4 the action regardless of its own position
on the question.15 However, it appears that recognition of marriages
was never truly part of the clause.1 6 In any event, the part of DOMA

8.
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat.
2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)).
9.
1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013).
10.
See generally Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
Id. at 2694.
11.
12.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2014).
13.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
14.
Though it may be exempt from enforcement of a foreign action that
contradicts its public policy. See Elisabeth Redpath, Comment, Between Judgment and
Law: Full Faithand Credit, Public Policy, and State Records, 62 EMORY L.J. 639, 65255 (2013) (describing situations in which public policy may allow states to escape the
Full Faith and Credit Clause).
15.
The language of the clause refers to "public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings." The public debate and some legal discussions include marriage in this
list. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
16.
As Lea Brilmayer said, marriage is like a license, and "[a] license is just
different. . . . It is not the sort of thing that is covered by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause." Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What are the National Implications of the
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quoted above, which is still good law (in the sense of validity), clearly
excludes same-sex marriages from the Clause. Thus, states are
allowed not to recognize marriages legally solemnized in other states
based on the parties' sexual identities, regardless of the actual
validity of the marriage according to the marital choice of law rules.
So while same-sex marriages are now, following the court's decision
in the Windsor case, equal to heterosexual marriages within states
allowing such marriages, even when it comes to federal-law rights,
they are still are not really considered marriages in the interstate
sphere. They are ineligible for the protection given to heterosexual
marriages, and they are susceptible to questioning and
reexamination. This questioning of parties' otherwise legally valid
actions and clearly manifested intentions (their "I do") essentially
replaces their marriages with a second-class, questionable
relationship, in which the parties are "married, but ....
2.

"Marriage Like"

"Marriage like" arrangements started out as an intermediate
solution for couples legally barred from marriage who sought a way to
formalize their relationship, namely same-sex couples. 17 These

&

Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional
Marriage Laws?: Hearing Before the Sub Comm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 22-23 (2004) (statement
of Professor Lea Brilmayer, Yale University School of Law), available at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/108hrg/96924.pdf
[http://perma.cclW7JX-2CDH]
(archived Jan. 19, 2015). Furthermore, she argued, "[i]n fact, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has never . . . been read to force one State to recognize a marriage entered into
in another State that was contrary to the local policies of the State where the marriage
was thought to be enforced." Id. at 22; see also BRIAN H. BIX, THE OXFORD
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: FAMILY LAW 47 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2013) (discussing
the perceived redundancy of DOMA given that states were not constitutionally
required to recognize marriages in other states under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES CROSS STATES LINES 114-36 (2006) [hereinafter KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT

STATES] (outlining the complexities of DOMA's effect on the recognition of judgments
by states that do recognize same-sex marriages, and discussing DOMA's potential
unconstitutionality); Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to the Same-Sex MarriageDebate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 35557 (2005) ("There is convincing historical research showing that the Clause and its
implementing statute were meant to realize the 'evidentiary' view that common law
courts took towards the judgments and laws of other states." (footnote omitted)).
17.
See, e.g., Antololskaia, Moving With Time, supra note 3, at 254-56
(describing the development of legislation regulating unmarried cohabitation); Ingrid
Lund-Andersen, The Nordic Countries: Same Direction - Different Speeds, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPE, supra note 4, at 3, 4-5 (noting

that registered partnerships provided essentially the same legal effects to same-sex
couples as a marriage provided to heterosexual couples). See generally Frederik
Swennen & Sven Eggermont, Same-Sex Couples in Central Europe: Hop, Step and
Jump, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPE, supra note 4,

at 19 (comparing the legal recognition offered to registered partnerships and marriages
in nine European countries).
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couples were offered alternatives such as civil unions, registered
partnerships,
and
domestic
partnerships.
Though
these
arrangements all are tools of the same nature and with similar ends
in mind, they are so diverse "that there are no two identical schemes"
for such relationships. 1 8 "Marriage like" relationships range from
those which are very similar to marriage to those which offer very
mild versions of marital commitment and outcomes. Some
relationships grant only inter-spousal rights, while others also create
some rights against the state;1 9 some create a familial relationship
while others do not; 20 some have rigid capacity requirements while
others are more lenient. 2 1
Regardless of the exact terms of the relationship, on the crossborder level they are all equally vulnerable. They are not eligible for
the application of choice of law rules for marriage, nor are they
systematically regulated by any cross-border stabilizing mechanism,
though some countries (namely many European ones) have specific
mechanisms regulating them. 22
3.

"Marriage Alternative"

While the "marriage, but" and "marriage like" arrangement are
aimed-to a large extent-to simulate marriage, the "marriage
alternative" arrangements
sometimes serve as a conceptual
substitute for marriage. The common denominator in all these
relationships is the lack of formal ex-ante regulation by the state
through a designated familial legal tool. Aside from that, the diversity
in arrangements under this category is enormous: some
arrangements are formal and others are informal, some
arrangements are opted into while others are opted out of, some grant
marriage-like rights in a flexible framework while some create a more
durable relationship with more limited rights.
One such relationship is the Israeli Reputed Couples (Yedu'im
baTzibur), which is a de facto relationship between people of the

18.
See Boele-Woelki, supra note 4, at 1962. For the variety in the United
States, see, for example, BIX, supra note 16, at 54-55.
19.
For example, Danish civil partnerships are almost identical to marriage in
the benefits it grants. On the other hand, the Swiss Partnerschaftsgesetz does not
bestow tax or social security benefits.
20.
See Swennen & Eggermont, supra note 17, at 27-29, 34-35 (outlining the
familial rights and responsibilities of legally recognized registered partnerships in nine
European countries).
21.
See id.
22.
Some countries apply the law of the place of registration, some apply
marital conflicts rules, and others apply their domestic laws. None suggests proper
theoretical foundation. For a comparison of such mechanisms, see Patrick Wautelet,
Private InternationalLaw Aspects of Same-Sex Marriages and Partnershipsin Europe
- Divided We Stand?, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPE,

supra note 4, at 143, 153-58, 166-75.
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same or opposite sex 23 who have been in a spousal relationship
25
(though not necessarily a sexual one 24 ) for a certain amount of time.
Such relationships can be created unintentionally, with the parties
embracing, accepting, or refraining from resisting the outcomes
bestowed upon them by law. Once the parties are a reputed couple,
their legal rights and duties are very similar to those of married
people, both toward each other and vis-A-vis third parties and the
state. It is only if they actively resist these outcomes that they are
relieved of them. Such unintentional relationships (i.e., cases where it
is the state that "tells" the parties they have a binding relationship
because of its duration or its characteristics -such as cohabitation or
the existence of a child) 26 exist in other countries as well. 2 7 In some
of them, even active resistance of the parties to the legal relationship,
expressed by contracting around it in a way showing their intent not
to be in a binding relationship, cannot relieve the parties of the legal
28
implication of the relationship.

23.
See Shahar Lifshitz, The External Rights of Cohabiting Couples in Israel,
37 ISR. L. REV. 346, 385-89, 420 n.7 (2003) [hereinafter Lifshitz, External Rights]; Zvi
Triger, Freedom from Religion in Israel: Civil Marriages and Cohabitation of Jews
Enter the Rabbinical Courts, 27 IsR. STUD. REV. 1, 8-9 (2012).
24.
CA 79/83 Attorney General v. Shukrun 39(2) PD 690 [1985] (Isr.); see also
CA 4385/91 Salem v. Carmi 51(1) PD 337 [1997] (Isr.).
25.
There is no clear definition of the amount (some argue that this is
intentional). See Lifshitz, External Rights, supra note 23, at 387 ("Courts have adopted
flexible criteria, which make it easier for couples to be considered as cohabitating
couples.... such as setting a minimum period of time for the couple to have been living
together . . . ."). However, in Amir v. Zager, the court has found that a period of mere
three months was enough to see the parties as a reputed couple. CC (TA) 3696/90 Amir
v. Zager, PM 16(9) (1991) (Isr.).
26.
See Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Same-Sex Partnershipsin English Family Law,
in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN

AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 605, 607 (describing three approaches for
legal regulation of relationships including one approach in which a relationship
becomes subject to legal regulation once certain statutorily defined requirements are
met).
27.
E.g., Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AA (Austl.) (laying out a system for defacto relationships in Australia where property rights are granted in all Australian
states based on local legislations); Boele-Woelki, supra note 4, at 1959 (mentioning
Portugal as a country where de facto unions are recognized for both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples). For examples of common law marriages recognized in Canada,
see, for example, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 s. 29 (Can.). See generally Claire
L'Heureux-Dub6, Same-Sex Partnershipsin Canada, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-

SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 4, at 211-13. For examples in the United States, see, for
example, UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (West 2014); Bix, supra note 16, at 33-35
(discussing common law marriages in the United States); id. at 51-53 (discussing longterm cohabitation).
28.
For example, in Israel, parties that intended not to subject themselves to
the commune property regime of reputed couples were still subjected to it if the court
found they actually manifested a commune lifestyle. CA 4385/91 Salem v. Carmi 51(1)
PD 337 [1997] (Isr.) (stating that parties were subjected to the commune property
regime despite the fact they have repetitively discussed formalizing their relationship
and decided not to do so); see also CA 52/80 Shachar v. Friedman 38(1) PD 443 [1984]
(Isr.) (declaring an apartment commune property even though it was registered to the
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Alongside
these
relationships,
"marriage
alternative"
relationships may also be actively created by parties through more
general, extra-familial tools, namely: contracts that regulate the
parties' duties and entitlements, copping, or improvising marital and
other rights into private regulation.
"Marriage alternative" relationships pose an even greater
problem than that posed by the other two types of ASR. They do they
not qualify for application of the choice of law rules for marriage, the
relationships are highly diverse, and many of them are de facto. They
are not formally concluded through a ceremony or even a contract,
though they may nonetheless require an actual legal dissolution (at
least with regard to division of assets, etc.). It is therefore more
complicated to know for sure whether such a relationship exists. It is
also unclear whether such a semi-formal (at best) relationship is
aimed at the state, let alone other states.
B. The Theoretical Relevance of
Alternative Spousal Relationships
ASRs have flourished during the past few decades, allowing a
variety of relationships-different in the level of commitment, in the
rights granted through the relationship, and the sexual orientation of
the spouses-to form publicly accepted and at least somewhat
recognized relationships, which nonetheless fall short of the full
recognition of marriage.2 9 These relationships, originally thought of
as temporary solutions,30 are now expected by some to disappear:
marriage is becoming increasingly flexible and allowing couples to
shape their relationships more freely, marriage impediments have
almost ceased to exist, and same-sex marriages are on the rise,3 1 so
one might think there is no longer a need for ASRs.
However, ASRs are a valuable tool that the law had better not
give up just yet. ASRs do not carry the historical and religious burden
carried by marriage, which makes ASRs a valuable laboratory for
spousal experiments. They allow reconsideration and re-evaluation of
the imbedded preconceptions, practices, and expectations of spousal
relationships, which are manifested in the marital arrangement.
Other than existing as an alternative to marriage and possibly
name of one spouse only in the deliberate intention to avoid creating commune
property and sharing it with the other spouse).
29.
See, e.g., Scott Titshaw, The Reactionary Road to Free Love: How DOMA,
State Marriage Amendments, and Social Conservatives Undermine Traditional
Marriage, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 205, 209, 267-82 (2012) (referring to these relationships
as "marriage light").
30.
This is particularly true in the same-sex context. See infra note 36.
31.
For the change in marriage, see the sources cited supra note 3; same sex
marriages were first legalized by the Netherlands in 2001 and have been spreading out
ever since. Over the last year alone same sex marriages were legalized in five new
countries (Brazil, England and Wales, France, New Zealand, and Uruguay) and many
U.S. states.
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supporting its stability and even development, 3 2 ASRs also allow
parties to opt out of marriage deliberately. They further allow for
manifestation of the parties' preferences 33 and conveyance of
messages regarding the nature of the relationship, both to their
spouse and to society as a whole.34
C. The PracticalRelevance of Alternative Spousal Relationships
ASRs are of importance not only to individuals seeking to shape
their lives together but also to policy-makers-regardless of their
political or moral views. When considering the history of ASRs in
different parts of the world, it is evident that these relationships now
serve both conservatives and liberals in shaping family law. While
conservative legislators use these relationships as means to bar

32.
ASRs can support the stability of marriage by catering to those left out of
marriage, allowing more limiting forms of marriage, creating a legal market, allowing
private parties experiment, and allowing evaluation of changes before introducing
them into marriage. See ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 16175(2009).
33.
This is well demonstrated by the fact that some couples still opt for ASRs
when they can marry. It is also seen in times of transition: when same-sex marriage
was introduced to Norwegian law, some couples chose not to convert their relationship,
showing a preference for the ASR over marriage. See Lund-Andersen, supranote 17, at
10. For the advantages of ASRs as a tool for choice and accurate relationships see, for
example, Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalization: Rhetorics of
Justification in the Same-Sex MarriageDebate, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 4, at 97, 100-04; Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding Marriage
Tunnel Vision, 88 TUL. L. REV. 257, 307-11 (2013) (proposing "a singular [relationship]
status with different levels" that incorporates varying degrees of commitment). For the
use of ASRs as a tool for expression and signaling, see Lifshitz, External Rights, supra
note 23, at 368; see also BIX, supra note 16, at 50; Harry D. Krause, Comparative
Family Law: Past Traditions Battle Future Trends-and Vice Versa, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1099, 1115 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006) (listing some of the benefits of "unmarried cohabitation");
Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a PluralistRegulation of Spousal
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1594-95 (2009) [hereinafter Lifshitz,
Married Against Their Will]; Titshaw, supra note 29, at 286-301 (discussing the
advantages of alternative marriage options). For a critical viewpoint on ASRs as
freedom, see JONATHAN HERRING, FAMILY LAW: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 22-25

(2014) (discussing some disadvantages to ASRs and noting that ASRs sometimes
mislead parties); HEATHER BROOK, CONJUGAL RITES: MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE-LIKE

RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE THE LAW 156-75 (2007) (arguing, based on feminist thinking,
that these relationships in fact mimic marriage, and thus do not offer real freedoms
and alternatives).
34.
See Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriageas a Signal, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 245, 249-54 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999); William Bishop, 'Is He
Married?':Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 245, 250-51, 258-59 (1984)
(framing the social and economic impacts of labeling a relationship a marriage);
Feinberg, supra note 33, at 308 (arguing that existing non-marital statuses "carry ...
marriage-related baggage" in places where the non-marital statuses were created "as
political compromises to avoid same-sex marriage" (footnote omitted)); Lifshitz,
Married Against Their Will, supra note 33, at 1594-95 (discussing the efficiency of
marriage and cohabitation as signals).
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certain individuals or couples from marriage while complying with
human rights demands, liberal legislators use those very same
relationships as means to extend the range of spousal options for all
couples, ushering non-traditional relationships into the mainstream.
A good example of such dual use of ASRs is the use of ASRs for
homosexual couples. A couple of decades ago the marriage of such
couples seemed impossible. With time, the growing pressure of this
group was addressed by offering ASRs, which in turn normalized
these couples in the legal arena. While in some conservative contexts
this public recognition of a non-marital relationship was perceived to
be an appropriate response to the needs of the homosexual
community,3 5 in liberal contexts this was a vehicle of revolution,
making the transition into homosexual marriage a viable option and
an ever-expanding reality. 36 In both cases, once law acknowledged
these relationships, it created a new version of a spousal relationship
that was appealing to both homosexual and heterosexual couples
interested in an alternative to the institution of marriage.3 7 The
interest in diversifying spousal relationships suggests that ASRs are
not merely a temporary tool, but a part of the general development of
the legal regulation of spousal relationships. It is not only a political
step on the way to marriage but also a full-fledged alternative serving
a facilitative function for those looking for such arrangements and as
such, is here to stay.

III. THE PROBLEM OF ALTERNATIVE SPOUSAL RELATIONSHIPS ON THE
MOVE

In order to understand the extent to which the lack of crossborder regulation of ASRs is a problem, the next step is to examine
the four factors of which a spousal relationship is composed and see
which of them should be protected when crossing borders.

35.
See Feinberg, supra note 33 at 262-63 (discussing this technique in the
United States); Swennen & Eggermont, supra note 17, at 25-26 (using nine European
countries to demonstrate the rationales for recognition of separate, non-marital
relationships).
36.
See Swennen & Eggermont, supra note 17, at 20-22, 30-33 (describing the
evolution of recognition for same-sex marriage from recognition for same-sex
partnerships). Indeed many countries had originally satisfied themselves with ASRs as
means to regulate same-sex relationships but later decided to allow same-sex
marriages. See generally Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex
Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 4, at 437 (discussing the history of same-sex marriage in the
Netherlands).
37.
For example, in Belgium, though same-sex marriages became available in
2003, tens of thousands still choose to enter cohabitation lgale. See Cohabitation
Ldgale, STATISTICS BELGIUM, http://statbel.fgov.be/fr/statistiques/chiffres/population/
mariage-divorcecohabitation/cohabitation/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) [http://perma.cc/85C77R2N] (archived Jan. 19, 2015).
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A. What is on the Move?
1.

Status

The first component of spousal relationships is commonly
referred to as "status." Statuses are legal acts affiliating a person
with a special class of people that are bestowed a unique bundle of
rights and capacities.38 Not only does the law control the content of
that status (the rights and duties, capacities and incapacities), but it
also dictates the terms for creating and dissolving it and its exact
content, leaving no room for renegotiation or personal expression. 9
Status means an entitlement to a formal relation and stand toward
society as a whole. 40 This means that the status would be recognized
and respected regardless of state lines. Traditionally, marriage was
considered a matter of status.
The cross-border regulation of this matter throughout the
Western world is rather straightforward: when it comes to marriages,
the common perception of this regulation is that a marriage is
considered valid when it is valid according to the country of the
parties' origin. To be exact, most western countries have traditionally
subjected questions of capacity to each of the parties' national or
domiciliary law and questions of form to the law of the place of
celebration: a marriage had to comply with the requirements of two
legal systems, each addressing a different question, in order to be
valid. 41
In traditional thinking, status was one of the core issues of
marriage recognition; 42 however, it may be that when discussing
ASRs status is the least important aspect of the relationship. There is
a rather wide consensus that marriage has profoundly changed over
the past century to the point that it has been privatized to a great
extent. As early as 1861, Maine described the transition of legal

38.
See T.E. HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 142-43 (13th ed.
1924); 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE

LAW 684 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1911); Carleton Kemp Allen, Status and
Capacity, 46 L. Q. Rev. 277, 281-83, 288-89 (1930).
39.

P.J. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 240-41 (12th ed. 1966); see

Allen, supra note 38, at 285-86 ("The capacities and incapacities which are attached
to . . . [a status] by law are entirely independent of the individual's choice").
40.
R.H. GRAVESON, STATUS IN THE COMMON LAW 2 (1953) (asserting that a
status and its effects "are a matter of sufficient social or public concern").
41.
For a comparative account, see Sharon Shakargy, Marriageby the State or
Married to the State? On Choice of Law in Marriage and Divorce, 9 J. PRIVATE INT'L
L. 499, 516-19 (2013). As noted there, the United States is an exception to that
Western norm. See supra note 1.
42.
One of the main motivations of choice-of-law rules regarding marriage was
to avoid the problem of "limping status." See, e.g., Kurt G. Siehr, Domestic Relations in
Europe: European Equivalents to American Evolutions, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 56
(1982).
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concepts from status to contract. 4 3 In marriage it appears that this

transition has come close to a full transformation, starting as a
matter closely monitored and regulated in detail by Church or state

and ending up as a matter governed almost exclusively by the parties'
will.44 This privatization has produced a conceptual change in the
idea of marriage so that the status aspects of it are limited, if they
exist at all, and so their manifestations no longer seem important to
the marriage. All the more so when it comes to ASRs that are not
founded on the status tradition which marriages are based on and
struggling with. ASRs are, inter alia, a choice-based relationship
because parties can achieve many if not most rights (particularly in
the inter-spousal realm) through private agreements without
entering the ASR.
Furthermore, ASRs are so diverse that one cannot detect a single
sweeping underlining principle in the different arrangements that
could be the subject of a cross-border status. ASRs do not create
classes of people, granting them unique capacities and rights in a
significant amount. These relationships are too diverse to create
distinct classes. The common denominator between ASRs, if there is
one, is so broad that what rights and capacities it grants are also
available to married parties or parties who are not in a formal
relationship. People can now agree to share property or support each

other financially, and modern law is usually willing to uphold such
agreements even if it does not consider the parties to be family
members. Children born to couples in an ASR are also equally
legitimate as children born to single parents. Therefore, the cluster of
rights created by ASRs is not a status one, in the sense that it is not
45
limited to status-bearers.
Though the extent to which an ASR is a matter of status may be
debated, the diversity of ASRs which makes them unfit for statusstyle international regulation is rather clear. Moreover, the
attribution of status features to ASRs is the core of the public policy
debate surrounding these relationships. Therefore, despite the
familial nature of most ASRs and the fact that familial relations are
usually protected via status in cross-border situations, it is suggested
that the concept of status should not be part of the cross-border

43.
See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 168-70 (John Murray ed., 13th
ed. 1890).
44.
This regulation included the entry and exit to and from marriage, the
content of marriage, and marriage being a unique arrangement granting results
unattainable without it. For a discussion of this transformation and its effect of choice
of law, see Shakargy, supra note 41, at 506-22.
45.
The only capacity aspect that can be attributed to ASR is that some spousal
relationships require that one be free of any prior spousal engagements, including nonmarital, in order to be allowed to form a new relationship. In that sense, an existing
ASR may be said to limit one's capacity. However, not every difference in capacity is a
matter of status, see Allen, supra note 38, at 289-90, and the limited effect ASR has on
one's capacity does not suffice to make ASRs a matter of status.
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regulation of ASRs. This seems to be a correct, principled approach
due to the incompatibility of these relationships to the legal (as
opposed to social) concept of status. More importantly, this would be
the only way for a viable solution that could avoid colliding with the
public policy barriers and with the practical difficulties resulting in
the diversity of ASRs.
2.

Durability

A second aspect that may be in need of protection when
discussing spousal relationships is the durability and stability of the
relationship, achieved by certain procedures attached to the
dissolution of the relationship. A person recognized as married is
entitled, alongside other rights and benefits, to various procedural
rights, the most important one being that of dissolution. A marriage
exists until a formal act of dissolution designated by law has been
performed. This right is of both emotional and practical importance.
In most legal systems, the right to an orderly dissolution creates an
opportunity for the parties to discuss the death of their relationship,
to negotiate their rights following its collapse, and to make
arrangements regarding life after its end. This also promotes clarity
and stability-not of the relationship itself, which may still be very
easily dissolved-but of people's self-definition. 46 It enables the
parties to know if and to whom they are connected and committed.
Though the details of this procedural right (for example, the exact
procedure required for obtaining a divorce) 4 7 may change between
legal systems, a person may still safely assume that so long as a
particular act did not take place,4 8 his/her marital status remains
unchanged. Cross-border protection of this procedural requirement as
a condition of terminating the relationship is crucial. Without it, the
disturbing reality might be that a short ride across the border could
eliminate a relationship without either of the parties noticing.
Western rules regarding these matters have changed with time, but
the basic principle remains. The dissolution of an existing marriage is
subjected to a procedure usually governed by a law connected to (at
least one of) the parties in way of nationality, domicile, or habitual

46.
This self-definition may stretch beyond the parties themselves: as
mentioned above, this self-definition has a public, status-like side. Though the clarity
of self-definition is not suggested to protect it as a matter of status, it is still worth
striving for.
47.
The connecting factor changes when, at the time of filing for divorce, the
couple has a different citizenship, domicile, or habitual residence than that which it
had at the time of the marriage.
48.
This action may be a court decision, or it may be one spouse saying, as is
the situation in a Talaq divorce, or another action such as a spouse's death, which is
another way for a marriage to expire. Though suggesting different levels of clarity, in
all these cases a pre-determined clear event has taken place.
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residence. 49 Thus, as long as the parties have not created such a
connection with the country of destination, the law of that country
would normally not influence their procedural entitlements. This is
not the case for ASRs that have no enduring legal connections and so
may be ignored as soon as the parties cross a border.
3.

Property-Related (and Other) Rights

The third aspect of a relationship that is in need of cross-border
protection is that of more traditional rights, mainly property rights.
Whenever a border is crossed, the risk of changes to rights exists. For
example, when one's country of origin and country of destination have
different marital or spousal property regimes, one's rights may
change when one crosses a border. Though the specifications of the
right may change-and those are indeed very important-the basic
understanding of the mutual dependence created by the relationship
and its relation to property entitlements usually remains. Not only
that, but as long as the transition is temporary, the property remains
under the same legal regime, that of the parties' personal law.5 0 Only
when the parties make a permanent move, thus acquire a new

49.
In some cases this law would be applied through jurisdiction: the forum
would apply its law, but a court would only have jurisdiction if connected to the parties
or one of them by virtue of nationality, domicile, or habitual residence (this is the case
in Common Law). In other cases there is a direct choice of law applying forum law
when the parties are so connected to the forum (e.g., France) or a mix of the two (e.g.
Switzerland). Finally, in some cases the applicable law would be that chosen by the
parties, but the parties may only choose a law to which they are connected in that
manner (e.g., Germany, Rome III regulation). See, e.g., Rome III Regulation on
Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Law Applicable to Divorce and
Legal Separation, Council Regulation 1259/2010, art. 5, 2010 O.J. (L 343) (EU) 13,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:343
:0010:0016:en:PDF [http://perma.cc/QTP5-KUVX] (archived Feb. 4, 2015) (providing
that spouses may select "the law applicable to divorce and legal separation" as long as
the selected law fits within one of four categories); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 285
(stating that, generally, courts in the United States apply the law of the domiciliary
state); see also Shakargy, supra note 41, at 516-22 (comparing choice-of-law rules in
the United States, England, and the European Union). Some U.S. states are willing to
discuss foreign relationships. For example, a New York court assumed jurisdiction to
discuss a Vermont civil union. See Dickerson v. Thompson, 928 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99-101
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (finding that New York courts had jurisdiction to dissolve a civil
union formed in another state); see also BIX, supra note 16, at 45 & n.63 (noting
Dickerson and pointing out that the decision was prior to New York's recognition of
same-sex marriage).
50.

See,

e.g.,

EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ

ZUM

BURGERLICHEN

GESETZBUCHE

[Introductory Act to the Civil Code], Sept. 21, 1994, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I
[BGBL. 1] 898, as amended, arts. 14-15 (Ger.) (giving divorcing couples in Germany a
choice as to which law applies); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 257 (defining the
generally applicable law in the United States as that of the domiciliary state or the law
chosen by contract); 2 DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1461,

¶

28R-001 (Lord Collins of Mapesbury, C.G.J. Morse & David McClean eds., 15th ed.
2012) [hereinafter DICEY (15th ed.)] (indicating that, in Common Law, interests in a
spouse's moveable property "are determined by the law of matrimonial domicile").
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personal law (domiciliary or national), might their property rights
change.5 1 Other money-related rights, such as maintenance, may be
regulated differently altogether. However, these issues are addressed
by rules, thus the resulting rights are protectable by law. Without
applying such protective mechanisms to ASRs, not only do the parties
stand to lose substantial monetary rights (possibly even when they
only move temporarily), but they are also harmed as their
relationship may be found to be lacking in substance and durability.

4.

Public Rights

A fourth aspect of relationships calling for protection in crossborder situations is that of public rights. A relationship may entail
some benefits such as tax exemptions, a right to afford one's spouse
immigration benefits (visa, residency, work permit), or a right to
some public immunities such as a right not to testify against a
spouse. In some jurisdictions some rights are only afforded to married
spouses, while in others they are also available for ASRs. For
example, the unmarried spouse of a U.S. citizen would not be eligible
for an immigration visa,52 while in Denmark she would.5 3 In other
cases, the rights not only differ between various relationships, but in
existence. For example, in some countries being considered a spouse

51.
Different legal systems treat these changes differently. Some systems apply
the law to which the parties have moved to the entire mass of property (full mutability,
e.g. Switzerland). Others apply to each item the personal law the parties had at the
time of acquisition (partial mutability, e.g. the United States). Lastly, some apply the
personal law that the parties had at the time of the marriage to all property acquired
consequently, regardless of later changes to the parties' personal law (immutability,
e.g. Germany). See HAROLD MARSH, JR., MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 104-

10 (1952) (discussing the leading cases for and rationales for full mutability, partial
mutability, and immutability); Robert A. Leflar, Community Property and Conflict of
Laws, 21 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 236-38 (1933) (discussing the due process concerns of one
state confiscating property that was acquired in another state).
52.
Unless the spouses declare their intention to marry within ninety days of
the spouse's arrival to the United States, in which case they would be issued a fianc
visa. For the general policy, see Immigrant Visa for a Spouse or Fianci(e) of a U.S.
Citizen, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/
types/family/fiance.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) [http://perma.cc/SR5Q-WJ83]
(archived Jan. 19, 2015). For the ninety days requirement, see U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., Petition for Alien Fianc6(e) (Form I-129F), pt. 4, available at http://
www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/formli-129f.pdf (last updated June 13, 2012) [httpI/
perma.ccK872-WVH4] (archived Jan. 19, 2015).
53.
DANISH

See Spouses and Cohabiting Partners, NEW TO DENMARK: THE OFFICIAL
PORTAL FOR FOREIGNERS, https://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/coming-to dk/

familyreunification/spouses/spouses.htm (last updated Jan. 5, 2015) [https://perma.cc/
Y3ZV-NAF9] (archived Jan. 19, 2015) (indicating that both spouses and cohabitating
partners "can apply for a residence permit on the grounds of family reunification").
These benefits are dependent of the relationship being recognizable in Denmark.
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would allow one to not testify against a spouse (e.g., California") but
not in other countries (e.g., Australia55 ).5 6
These public rights are dependent not only on the relationship
but also on its acceptance by the destination country. They are not a
natural consequence of the interpersonal commitment and are
granted by the State, incurring actual monetary or other costs on the
public. When countries give such benefits to a couple who have
entered foreign marriages, for example, they do so based on their own
local laws regarding the benefits of marriage rather than based on
what the couple may have had in the law under which the
relationship was created. So a Californian spouse sued in Australia
cannot expect to enjoy the spousal privileges she had at home, nor
can a Danish couple rightly expect to be granted the same visa right
in the United States as they had in Denmark.
Public rights may truly make a difference in a couple's life.
However, they impose not on the parties in the spousal commitment
but on the country hosting the couple and its community. And while a
country might find it hard to justify interference in the distribution of
assets or capacities between consenting parties, it may very easily
explain why it should not be compelled to subject its legal rules (e.g.,
evidence rules) or monetary policy (e.g., tax benefits) to the wishes of
the parties. Though party autonomy is a principle of growing
importance, states are still allowed sovereignty over policy decisions
(that are not clearly infringing on human rights, etc.).5 1 Therefore,
though withholding public rights might in some cases interfere in
what constitutes a spousal relationship, this interference is not prima
facie undue.
This way of thinking of spousal rights may also explain the fact
that while interpersonal rights survive the transition, rights relating
to the fourth claim mentioned above (rights towards the public or the
state) do not. Such rights need to be acquired toward the specific
state or community. They are beyond the scope of private

See CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (Deering 2015).
54.
55.
See generally Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart [2011] HCA 47
(Austl.).
56.
For an interesting discussion of this privilege vis-A-vis same-sex spouses
(writing from a pre- Windsor point of view, therefore no longer describing the situation
of married same-sex couples in the United States., but relevant to all other ASR
supposes), see generally Bennett Capers, Enron, DOMA, and Spousal Privileges:
Rethinking the MarriagePlot, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (2012).
57.
While one might argue that distinguishing between marriage and ASRs or
indeed different types of ASRs is a forbidden discrimination which should be out of the
legitimate scope of state sovereignty, such an argument is not at all obvious, among
other reasons, since at least in some cases of ASR it is the spouses themselves that
have chosen to enter an arrangement which is different than marriage.
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international law and this Article for that matter, as they are a public
matter.5 8
B. Cross-BorderProtectionof Marriage
The cross-border regulation of marriage addresses all three of
the central private aspects of a relationship and even the fourth,
public, one. The choice of law rules governing marriage ultimately
regulate the parties' status, the dissolution procedure to which they
are entitled, and their bundle of actual rights both locally and
internationally. Further, the cross-border strength of marriage
manifested and promoted by the cross-border rules governing it
extends even to the fourth claim: countries are willing, having
recognized a foreign marriage as valid and binding, to treat it as their
own and grant it the public benefits awarded to local marriages. An
example of such willingness would be the granting of tax benefits to a
couple that have entered a foreign marriage following recognition of
the marriage by the forum. This regulation creates a well-rounded,
stable, and therefore appealing legal outcome with clear advantages:
parties opting into marriage are inoculated against sudden changes
and effects of random territorial factors on their relationship. Their
mutual rights and duties are clearly stipulated. This clear regulation
also allows the shortcomings and limitations of the arrangement to be
seen, known, and addressed or made peace with.
C. Cross-BorderProtection of ASRs
The cross-border situation of ASRs is nothing like that of
marriage. ASRs lack the cross-border protection of rights and "status"
given to other relationships, as they are not systematic, as explained

58.
This is despite the fact that some authors focus on such rights as one of the
leading aspects when discussing the need for cross-border regulation of such
relationships. See, e.g., Barry Crown, Civil Partnership in The U.K. - Some
InternationalProblems, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 697, 698-703 (2004) (demonstrating the
challenges of acquiring public rights in multi-national, same-sex partnerships and
proposing that same-sex couples be permitted to "register a civil partnership
overseas"). Public rights, and particularly immigration rights, are the core of this
discussion in the EU context, following the Union's commitment to freedom of
movement. See generally Boele-Woelki, supra note 4, at 1968-70 (discussing
recognition mechanisms as the way for Member States to cope with their duty to allow
freedom of movement); Justin Borg-Barthet, The PrincipledImperative to Recognise
Same-Sex Unions in the EU, 8 J. PRIVATE INT'L L. 359 (2012) (suggesting ways to better
the cross-border regulation of ASRs in the European Union based on the Union's
commitment to human rights). For a better framework for addressing this issue, see
generally Steve Sanders, The ConstitutionalRight to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage,
110 MICH. L. REV. 1421 (2012) (using constitutional arguments to suggest a recognition
mechanism that appears to be possible only in federative structures or in international
treaties).
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above, and are thus difficult to compare with one another.5 9 Some of
the current regulations deny parties other benefits as well-monetary
rights and durability (and, of course, public rights) are often denied.
Though, in some instances, ASRs are local in the sense that they are
available only to couples having a strong formal connection to the
relevant country, 60 these relationships still cross borders and need
protection.
1.

The Limited Mobility of Some ASRs: Existing Solutions

Several legislators have addressed the issue of cross-border
regulation for ASRs, either for the sake of the relationship and the
parties or for policy reasons. However, these local solutions are in
many cases problematic. Often they downgrade the relationship,
causing the parties to lose rights already attained elsewhere.6 1 In
other cases the local mechanism upgrades the relationship, granting
the parties more than they initially and intentionally received. 62 Both
upgrading and downgrading are problematic, as the following
discussion will show, and are inevitable in a status-oriented world,
due to the great diversity of arrangements.
a.

Downgrading Mechanisms

Some countries that have addressed the issue of ASRs have done
so in a manner that breaks away from traditional "as-is transference"
choice of law regimes and downgrades the relationship. The clearest
and best-known case is that of same-sex marriages. The substantive
validity and cross-border stability of a marriage does not depend on
the attitude of the creating state alone.
As mentioned, when a marriage is valid according to the relevant
law (personal law for capacity and lex loci celebrationis for the
ceremony), it is considered valid by most, if not all, Western
countries. However, when it comes to same-sex marriages, some
states rule that though the marriage would have been considered

59.
See Martina Melcher, (Mutual) Recognition of Registered Relationships Via
EU Private International Law, 9 J. PRIVATE INTL. L. 149, 150 (2013) (discussing
difficulties arising from disparate ASR laws in Europe).
60.
For example, those of Denmark and Finland usually demand at least one
party to be habitually residing locally. See Lund-Andersen, supra note 17, at 6-7;
Maarit Jantera-Jareborg, Registered Partnerships in Private InternationalLaw: The
Scandinavian Approach,

in

LEGAL

RECOGNITION

OF

SAME-SEX

COUPLES

IN

EUROPE 137, 139, 147 (Katharina Boele-Woelki & Angelika Fuchs eds., Eur. Family
Law Ser. No. 1, 2003) (noting that Denmark and Finland both had habitual residence
and/or citizenship requirements for members of registered partnerships).
61.
See, e.g., Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33, § 213 (U.K.) (allowing the
Secretary of State to recognize same-sex marriages as civil partnerships).
62.
See, e.g., Hincks v. Gallardo, (2013) 113 O.R. 3d 654, ¶1 3, 29-37, 53-54,
80-85 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J).
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valid under the traditional choice of law rules which those states
follow, the marriage will nonetheless not be recognized accordingly.
One such ruling is the DOMA legislation, which singles out same-sex
marriages, allowing U.S. states to deny recognition to an otherwise
valid marriage due to preferences of the recognizing state. DOMA
creates an ex-ante constitutional interpretation of laissez-faire,
avoiding the regular case-by-case scrutiny commonly known and
accepted in private international law (i.e., public policy).63 This
arrangement leaves the parties stranded, when it comes to their
relationship and rights, and does so intentionally. However, it at least
addresses the issue and gives the parties fair warning.
Another way to address the issue was adopted in Swiss
legislation. Under that legislation, a same-sex couple married in a
country where such a marriage is legal would be recognized in
Switzerland as a couple in a civil partnership, rather than as
married, 64 by virtue of a public policy exception to the regular rule
applying to cross-border marriages. By recognizing the relationship
as a civil partnership the law subjected the relationship to a rights
regime and a dissolution procedure the couple might not have been
expecting. Unlike DOMA, this mechanism gave the parties a clear
and formal alternative rather than leaving them stranded.
Nonetheless, it still downgraded the relationship not only by taking
away one of its symbolic features (namely, the title "marriage") but
also by changing the entitlements attached to it (mainly "public"
rights, but sometimes also other rights). This downgrading
mechanism, exists in other countries as well, 65 demonstrating the
anomalies caused by the existing thinking of conflicts rules on the
matter.66

See supra note 16.
63.
64.
See LOI FEDERALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 1987, RS 291,
art. 45(3) (Switz.).
See, e.g., Dieter Martiny, Private InternationalLaw Aspects of Same-Sex
65.
Couples Under German Law, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN
EUROPE, supra note 4, at 189, 197-98 (describing the downgrading mechanism in
Germany). This was the famous arrangement of English law. See Civil Partnership
Act, 2004, c. 33, § 213 (U.K.); DICEY (15th ed.), supra note 50, at 951, ¶ 17-089 (stating
that same-sex marriages were not permitted in England and that foreign same-sex
marriages would only be recognized as civil partnerships). This law was canceled only
recently following the introduction of same-sex marriages to the law of this country.
See Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act, 2013, c. 33, § 1 (U.K.).
66.
The anomaly is further stressed when comparing the recognition situation
to the way a transition within a state is made: when countries introduce same-sex
marriages to their laws, they do not automatically transform all same sex ASRs to
marriages. For an example in Norway, see Lund-Andersen, supra note 17, at 10.
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Upgrading Mechanisms

In some cases, a legislator or judge may wish to help the parties
by re-evaluating their relationship not as less than it was but rather
as more. Such was the decision of the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice in the case of Hincks v Gallardo,6 7 which took the opposite
approach to that of the U.S. legislation. While the U.S. legislation
would have downgraded a Canadian same-sex marriage to be a civil
partnership in some U.S. states, the judges in the Hincks case
deemed an English civil partnership entered into by a Canadian
couple to be a marriage in Canada, though the parties could have
married in Canada and chose not to do so. Thus, the court upgraded
the relationship, going beyond the parties' expectations and their
intention to enter a non-marital relationship. The court subjected the
parties, in a sense, to a different type of commitment with a weight of
historical, religious, and cultural significance. Such outcomes
undermine the parties' wishes and interfere with their expectations.
c.

Unforeseeable "Mechanisms"

Despite their problems, both cases mentioned above have the
advantage of clarity: they both permit parties to know in advance how
a court in their country of destination would treat their relationship.
In cases where the recognizing country has no formal recognition
mechanism or a publicly declared position on the matter, the
standing of the parties' relationship would depend upon an ad hoc
decision by the court asked to recognize the relationship. In the
absence of choice of law rules, the court would apply the law of the
forum, so the outcome would depend heavily on whether or not the
relationship entered into by the parties adds up-in substance and
form-to a relationship known and regulated by local law. If it does
not, the court would most probably either deem the relationship nonexistent in the forum, or it would try to deduce some rights from the
relationship based on general principles such as good faith and vested
rights. This, of course, makes such cases highly susceptible to forum
shopping and other distortions. Furthermore, so long as there is no
precedent regarding the public policy of the forum, the court is free to

67.
See Hincks, 113 O.R. 3d 654, ¶¶ 3, 29-37, 53-54, 80-85 ("The parties could
not have married in the U.K. because that country does not permit same-sex couples to
marry. Canadian law specifically holds that only equal access to marriage for civil
purposes would respect same- sex couples' right to equality without discrimination.
Failing to recognize the U.K. civil partnership as a marriage would perpetuate
impermissible discrimination."). For further discussion, see Sandro Wiggerich, Civil
Partnership as Marriage: The Recognition of Foreign Same-Sex Unions Under
CanadianLaw, 76 INT'L FAM. L. 42 (2014).
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make up its own mind on the matter, leaving the parties ever more
exposed to the ad hoc decisions and lengthy proceedings.

IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTION

The problem of cross-border ASRs is not limited to the lack of a
choice of law rule. ASRs also pose some interesting conflicts issues
that are more closely connected to the characteristics of these
relationships. Therefore, it might be advisable to evaluate ASRs and
the challenges they pose before deciding on a choice of law rule for
such relationships.
A. ASRs Choice of Law Challenges
1.

"Translation"

As mentioned above, ASRs are very diverse. There may be
countries that have ASRs with equal or similar terms (e.g., the
original relationship is a domestic partnership and the recognizing
country has such relationships in its law, with proximate or similar
conditions and outcomes). There might be cases where the
recognizing country has in its law the same relationship for which
recognition is needed, but under its law that relationship has very
different outcomes (e.g., the relationship grants marriage-like rights
in one country and very limited partnership rights in the other).
There also may be countries that do not have the exact relationship
for which recognition is sought but have other proximate
relationships (e.g., the original relationship is a domestic partnership,
and the law of the recognizing country does not have this relationship
but does have civil partnerships or cohabitation). All these cases give
rise to the question of "translation," that is, how one copies a
relationship across borders. 6 8 Another issue is that of countries that
do not have such a relationship in their law at all on principle or for
other reasons.
Unlike marriage, ASRs do not enjoy a universally known and
respected "brand names." They lack the long-standing tradition and

68.
This translation is similar to, but not the same as, adaptation in that
adaptation is mainly focused on bridging and harmonizing different rights regimes
when transferring a single legal concept to a different country. See Wronique
Allarousse, A Comparative Approach to the Conflict of Characterization in Private
International Law, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 479, 510-11 (1991) (discussing the
theory of adaptation). Translation as defined here, on the other hand, has more to do
with the reinterpretation of the legal concept as a whole, which extends beyond the
adaptation of rights and includes the characterization of the relationship and the
bundle of rights it entails in local terms and fitting it into a system where it is
sometimes very different or even unknown.
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layers of meaning that marriage has. If ASRs grant any status at
all,69 that status does not convey a clear and widely respected
meaning nor does it have a strong tradition to rely on. Furthermore,
it is not clear that parties choose a particular ASR and not another or
that they prefer an ASR to marriage, for reasons of status. It is
probably more accurate to assume that in most (though not all) 70
cases, parties choose a particular scheme for the rights and benefits it
provides, rather than the "status" it may create. So, it may be argued
that the essence of ASRs, particularly in the case of "marriage like"
and "marriage alternative" types, is the bundle of rights they provide
rather than their title or any symbolic value. In the case of "marriage,
but" regimes, the issue may be status, but that status is under public
debate and so any attempt to support it through choice of law rules
would probably be trumped by public policy arguments. Thus,
insisting on addressing it in the conflicts rules regulating ASRs seems
pointless.7 1 It is therefore suggested that the key feature in need of
recognition when discussing ASRs is the rights they bestow, while the
exact title of the relationship is less important.
2.

Characterization

Characterization of ASRs is necessary in order to determine the
way to create cross-border recognition mechanisms for ASRs
(meaning, the type of conflicts rule). 7 2 The recognition should be

69.
Which is questionable, as discussed above, because even marriage is
becoming less connected to status conceptualization. Also, these relationships do not
create clear groups of people with unique sets of rights and capacities. See generally
AUSTIN, supra note 38 (providing requirements for the creation of a status for a group
of people); HOLLAND, supra note 38 (providing requirements for the same); Allen, supra
note 38 (providing requirements for the same). Finally, some ASRs, such as the French
Pacte Civile de Solidaritd (PaCS), manifestly do not involve status. See Mary Ann
Glendon, Family Law in a Time of Turbulence, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAw: PERSONS AND FAMILY § 15 (Aleck Chloros, Max Rheinstein & Mary
Ann Glendon eds., 2007); Halley, supra note 33, at 101-04; Swennen & Eggermont,
supra note 17, at 33 (indicating that it is unclear whether the PaCS affects an
individual's civil status in France). So even if ASRs are a status-related matter, they
are less of status than marriage, and they range between "less status" to "no status."
70.
In cases where the parties chose ASRs over marriage, they were clearly not
looking for the marital status. In cases where marriage was not an option it is unclear
whether the ASR "status" is a choice or a last resort.
71.
Note that ASRs conflicts rules would only be applied to same-sex marriages
in situations when they are not considered a marriage but a "marriage, but." A country
that is willing to recognize such marriages as full-fledged marriages would apply its
regular marital rules to such marriages, not ASR rules.

72.
Scott Fruehwald concludes that none of the existing methodologies for
cross-border recognition are suitable and opts for another arrangement, which is
surprisingly similar in outcome (though not in structure) to the one discussed here. See
Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L. REV. 799, 836-40
(1999) (providing a methodological discussion in the U.S. context regarding only
"marriage, but" relationships). Sandrine Henneron suggests a similar outcome, but
without sufficient basis to support reaching this outcome. See Sandrine Henneron, New
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subjected to the law that will best serve both the parties in the
relationship and the policies of the recognizing country, both with
regards to the substantive issue at hand and to conflict of laws. The
search is not for the law of this or that country but for the law
connected to the case or the parties in a particular way. Identifying
that law must start with characterizing the relationship. Only then
will it be possible to find the choice of law category through which the
governing law would be chosen, as some categories limit the possible
applicable laws.
One such category is the one used in matters of personal status,
including marriage and the rights resulting from it. Applying the
status-protective family law choice of law concept might be desirable
because of the advantages it offers, namely stability, clarity, and
certainty.73 Traditionally, one of the major concerns addressed by the
regulation of cross-border marriages was the prevention of cases of
uncertainty and "limping status," where, for example, a person is
considered married under one law and single under another.7 4 Choice
of law rules for family matters have typically tackled this problem by
using the consistent application of one's personal law to the matter,75
regardless of the forum discussing the question, thus ignoring
random influences and factors. 76 This creates a rather consistent
result throughout the world, applying a single law to a particular
marriage regardless of the jurisdiction.7 7
At first sight, personal law seems fitting for the cross-border
regulation of ASRs, since they are family or family-like relationships.

Forms of Cohabitation:Private International Law Aspects of Registered Partnerships,
in PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND HARMONISATION

OF FAMILY LAW IN

EUROPE 462, 469-70 (Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., Eur. Family Law Ser. No. 4, 2003).
Further, Henneron completely rejects the contractual framing of the question based on
grounds that are rejected here. See id. at 467.
73.
Such an approach is discussed by G6rald Goldstein, La cohabitation hors
mariage en droit international priod, 320 RECUEIL DES COURS 165-72 (2006)
[hereinafter Goldstein]. Goldstein favors the rule of personal law on the matter based
on the traditional conceptualization of status. See id. at 288-91; see also KOPPELMAN,
DIFFERENT STATE, supra note 16, at 89-91 (providing an additional example of a
status-based approach, this one rooted in "domicile").
74.
See Siehr, supra note 42, at 52-53 ("In order to avoid limping family
relations some European countries are now more liberal in recognizing foreign
judgments than formerly.").
75.
With the sole exception of the question of the validity of a marriage, which
is subject to the law of the place of celebration.
76.
This was also connected to the concept of a person "belonging" to a state.
See Shakargy, supra note 41, at 516 ("The choice-of-law rules ... still bind people and
their marriages to particular states to which they are thought to 'belong', denying
parties the ability to contract their marriage and its dissolution freely under any other
law." (footnote omitted)).
77.
Countries may have different connecting factors (domicile, nationality, or
habitual residence). They might also interpret a situation differently, thus disagreeing
on the identification of the country of nationality, domicile, or habitual residence. But
personal law is still a rather clear definition, and its being used throughout the world
makes it more likely that different countries would reach similar results.
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The regulation may also be appealing as a symbolic statement, since
it would clearly mark ASRs as family matters, even where the law is
reluctant to label these relationships in this way. However, this
advantage is at the same time a disadvantage because it is likely to
give rise to public policy objections and since some people opt in to
these relationships with the clear intention of avoiding familial ties. 7 8
On a more principled note, applying personal law to ASRs is
inappropriate. First and foremost, it is very limiting since it forces
the parties to comply with the law to which they are formally
connected either by domicile, nationality, or habitual residence. 7 9
This personal law connection is also less appropriate in a world where
marriage has changed and shifted from the realm of status to that of
contracts, as described above. 8 0 Moreover, ASRs are used as a distinct
alternative to marriage, whether due to the choice of the parties (who
actively chose an ASR) or the State (which denied the couple access to
marriage and offered the ASR as a substitute). ASRs are more
contractual than marriage, both in form and in substance. They rely
neither on a holy sacrament and religious principles nor on any
collective historical narrative of spousal relationships. Instead,
though they are offered by the state, they are based upon and aimed
at catering to the parties' wishes and preferences. They may be
described as private partnership agreements and given some public
recognition, but it is still more contractual than marriage.
The status conceptualization, inherent in applying only personal
law, weakens the parties' control over the relationship and
strengthens that of law. The control of the law may be expressed both
with regard to the existence of the relationship and with regard to its
content, since the creation, the content, and the dissolution of status
are controlled by law. ASRs are a choice-related tool: in some
countries they coexist alongside alternatives, and parties may always
choose not to formally regulate their relations at all; in many cases
they may choose marriage instead of the ASR; and at least some
ASRs are more a framework that is more easily tuned and changed
through private accords the parties reach. 8

78.

See KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATE, supra note 16, at 95 (pointing out that

uniform recognition of ASRs would give too little weight to states' public policy-based
objections).
79.
See Shakargy, supra note 41, at 526-27 (suggesting that in today's age of
globalization, increased mobility, and "multi-layered identities," tying an individual to
the laws of a single nation based on domicile or nationality is flawed).
80.
As this connection is a result of status. See id. at 516-19, 522-23 (noting
that legislation has changed in an attempt to recognize the increasingly private and
contractual nature of marriage but explaining that the legislative changes have not
been sufficient because the legislation still emphasizes the connection between the
couple and the state).
81.
Indeed, these changes also influence marriage: when co-existing with
alternatives, marriage becomes an elected rather than forced institution. The growing
acceptance of pre- and post- nuptial agreements promotes the parties' preferences over
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As contractual relationships, rather than a status-based one,
ASRs are, and should be, less concerned with public-oriented
interests of the state and more focused on private virtues.
Traditionally, marital relations were aimed not only at creating trustworthy unions for couples but also, and more importantly, at
protecting the public interest in unions. Married couples were the
only people licensed to live as couples and bear children. As such,
marriage protected particular interests beyond those of the couple.82
The importance of this relationship was reflected in the fact they
could not shape it as they saw fit, and many terms, including
financial and interpersonal ones, were non-negotiable. They were
considered matters of great importance to society as a whole. 83
When fundamental social and moral interests are involved, they
may at times justly trump ordinary legal values and justify nonrecognition of an otherwise valid relationship. However ASRs were
created in a more relaxed legal atmosphere, and, unlike traditional
marriage, they have no extraordinary regulatory inspirations. As
such they only reflect general values commonly protected by law,
such as the promotion of clarity, protection of justified reliance,
fairness, and holding one to one's word. Under this privatized
conceptualization of ASRs, it would seem less appropriate for the law
to intervene in a private relationship created under another law and
alter commitments and duties in it without very good cause. This
would be unbecoming not only for reasons of stability and clarity but
also due to comity. Moreover, invalidating the relationship and
allowing a party to escape from a commitment he or she has taken on
could not be done without very strong justification. Therefore, it is
suggested to characterize the relationship as a contract, in a way that
centers the mutual commitment of the parties and focuses on
maintaining it and its content as much and as exactly as possible.84

those of the state. However, marriage still carries historical, religious, and social
meanings that limit its liberation. ASRs are free of those limitations.
82.
Hence, the conceptualization of marriage as status. See generally Shakargy,
supra note 41 (discussing the evolving nature of the state's interest in marriage and
marriage recognition as marriage becomes increasingly privatized).
83.
See id. at 500-10 (summarizing the history of state regulation of marriage
in Europe).
84.
See Martiny, supra note 65, at 195-96. Martiny offers a comprehensive
analysis of the issue from a German standpoint and suggests various solutions to the
different relationships. Not only does this add complexity to courts' works of
recognition, but it also requires ex-ante evaluation and characterization of each and
every possible ASR (which may prove difficult) for this to be a systematic solution that
would allow reliance and clarity. Further, if applied to multi-country thought
framework, such as that of the current discussion, the suggested solution would only
work if countries around the world would agree on the characterization of each
relationship, as disagreement would be a notable incentive for forum shopping as well
as other undesirable outcomes such as lack of clarity and certainty.
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B. Applicable Law of an ASR: Which is the ProperLaw of That
Contract?
1.

In Cases Where there is an Actual Contract

One of the "'general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations"' 8 is that the law considered "the proper law of the contract"
should apply to cross-border contracts.86 The proper law of the
contract is, generally, that law which the parties have chosen, in an
explicit or implied manner, to apply to their contract.87 Such a choice
may be stated in the contract or deduced from surrounding
circumstances such as an apparent interaction of the contract with a
certain law (e.g., when the parties use terms or address issues that
are unique to a particular system). This choice is limited by
considerations of public policy, good faith, and legality.88 In Civil Law
and in the United States, 89 the choice is also limited by the

85.
RICHARD PLENDER & MICHAEL WILDERSPIN, THE EUROPEAN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 131 (3d ed. 2009) (citation omitted).

86.

Giesela

Rifhl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of

Contracts: TransatlanticConvergence and Economic Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS

IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 153, 157-58 (Eckart Gottschalk et al. eds., 2007) (indicating
that party autonomy has become "'a universal approach"' and is rarely questioned "in
both Europe and the United States" (footnote omitted)).
87.
See 2 DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1161-62, r. 180 (Lord
Collins of Mapesbury ed., 11th ed. 1987) [hereinafter DICEY (11th ed.)]. The respect
toward the autonomy of the parties is what makes that law so proper. See SYMEON C.
SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (2008) ("It is an ancient

principle that parties to a multi-state contract should be allowed to choose, within
certain limits, the law that would govern their contract (party autonomy)." (footnote
omitted)); MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 414 (2d ed. 1950, reprint.

1977) ("Just as the parties are permitted to create rights and duties between
themselves as they please, and thus to 'make law for themselves', [sic] so it is for them
to determine the law governing their contract." (footnote omitted)).
88.
At Common Law, this exception was first stated is the famous case of Vita
Food ProductsInc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277, 290 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from N.S.) (Can.). See DICEY (11th ed.), supra note 87, at 1170 ("'[W]here there is an
express statement by the parties of their intention to select the law of the contract, it is
difficult to see what qualifications are possible, provided the intention expressed is
bona fide and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding the choice on the
ground of public policy."' (footnote omitted)). This edition is the last before the Rome
Convention was adopted by England and is therefore the most updated version of
Common Law. This formula requiring that a choice of law be "bona fide and legal" and
the absence of reasons "for avoiding the choice on the ground of public policy" has never
been applied in England to strike down a choice of law, but it is still considered to be
the law and was implemented in a Scottish case and several Australian cases. See id.
at 1171-72. The proper law must also be an existing law. See id. at 1176-78.
89.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 187. Under § 187, the contract must
include a foreign element, and the choice must be reasonable. See id. cmt. f. The
contractual classification allows flexible links between the parties and the law: creating
a contract in a country and through its registry and through its procedure (or staying
in a country long enough to create a cohabitation under its law) should suffice to link
the lex loci contractus to the case and allow its application.
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requirement that the contract have some link to the chosen law.90 In
the absence of choice by the parties, the proper law of the contract is
that which is most closely connected to the contract.9 1
What is the proper law of an ASR? The law the parties have
chosen or the law most connected to the relationship may be one of
many choices, but the special circumstances of the ASR make it
easier to detect the most relevant law. ASRs are contractual
mechanisms made by law. In many, if not most, cases, parties enter
these relationships without exercising their contractual freedom to
stipulate any terms of their own.9 2 By doing-or rather not doing-so,
they enter into the arrangements made by the specific legal system as
is. They are influenced to a great extent by the decisions made by the
legislators of that arrangement, and they are practically accepting
these decisions as their own. This forms a special connection between
the contract and the law under which it is created.
Once again, one may be inclined to apply personal law as the
proper law of this relationship, but this inclination must be resisted.
Previously, it was argued that ASRs should be characterized as
contractual and not status-based familial relations. Personal law
should not be seen as the proper law of the contract for similar
reasons: once the relationship has no real and justifiable status
implications by its nature,9 3 the law of the country to which the
parties "belong", as such, has no special relevance. 94 In cases where
parties contract an ASR in a foreign country, it is exactly this
personal law that they are trying to evade, and this evasion should
not be impeded without proper cause, such as public policy. 95

90.
See Rihil, supra note 86, at 161 (suggesting that any grounds the parties
have for their choice of law would suffice); Bernd von Hoffmann, Assessment of the
E.E.C. Convention from a German Point of View, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS-THE E.E.C.
CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE

STUDY 221, 222 (P.M. North ed. 1982) ("There is no German case law in which a choice
of law made by the parties has been set aside; however, there is considerable authority
in German legal writing that requires some kind of reasonable interest for the choice of
law.").
91.
See DICEY (11th ed.), supra note 87, at 1161-62.
92.
As a matter of principle, the parties are free to create a contract governed
by the law of their choice, and courts would uphold that choice of law if it complies with
regular contractual choice of law rules. However, if they wish to receive any public
benefits under the law of the lex loci contractus, they should probably avoid this path.
93.
Unlike status, personal law is not a law-made, strictly regulated concept
that creates classes of people with unique sets of rights and capacities. See, e.g.,
GRAVESON, supra note 40, at 2 (defining status and pointing out that status and its
effects are "matter [s] of sufficient social or public concern").
94.
Goldstein, supra note 73, at 58-59 mentions a similar idea, based on
Mayer's work, using not a contractual basis but rather the conflict of authorities
theory.
95.
The fact that the home country of the parties does not have the particular
ASR in its law, or indeed does not offer ASRs at all, does not necessarily mean that the
relationship would raise public policy concerns.
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In fact, it appears that the law most relevant to the relationship
is not the personal law of the parties but the local law of the
relationship, that is, the law under which the relationship was
created and entered into. By opting into a specific ASR in a certain
country and under a given law, the parties demonstrate a preference
for that country and its laws, though not necessarily a connection to
them. The parties opt into a predetermined set of rights and duties,
set by the law governing their relationship in the time and place of
creation. It is this commitment in that exact degree which the parties
choose for themselves. The relationship itself, being formulized by a
law and bureaucratic procedure of a particular country, is closely
connected to that country. Further, some countries make their ASRs
available only to people with a clear formal connection to the country,
thus reaffirming the link of the parties to the local law. 96 Therefore,
the law of the country where the ASR was entered into is the law
which best describes the parties' expectations, wishes, and to some
extent-their affiliations. 9 7 Thus, it is the most proper law to be
applied to this contract. 9 8 As long as the parties have not stated
otherwise, it is to be assumed that they have not intended to subject
their commitment to geographic boundaries and have it exist only in
the place of creation. Therefore, the law under which the ASR was
entered into should govern any discussion of this relationship
anywhere in the world.

96.
For example, Finland, like Denmark, requires partners seeking to enter a
registered partnership to be closely tied to Finland. See Lund-Andersen, supra note 17,
at 6-7. France only allowed foreigners to enter its same-sex marriage scheme following
a court decision. See Circulaire du 29 mai 2013 de pr6sentation de la loi ouvrant le
mariage aux couples de personnes de mime sexe (dispositions du Code civil) NOR:
JUSC1312445C, http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/artpix/JUSC1312445C.pdf.
97.
For a similar position based on different grounds, see Janeen M.
Carruthers, Scots Rules of PrivateInternationalLaw ConcerningHomosexual Couples,
10.3 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1, 7 (2006) (articulating the Scottish rules for recognizing
foreign domestic partnerships as civil partnerships). For a discussion of de-facto
cohabitation where the "proper law of cohabitation" is clearly designated as the
applicable law, see id. at 15-16; see also Melcher, supra note 59, at 161-62 (discussing
the place of registration as the most appropriate criteria for establishing cross-border
continuity of a registered relationship).
98.
See similarly, in a treaty context, Convention sur la reconnaissance des
partenariats enregistres, International Commission on Civil Status, Sept. 4, 2007,
ICCS Convention no. 32 art. 3, http://ciecL.org/Conventions/Conv32Ang.pdf [http://perma.cr/
ZB75-35P2] (archived Feb. 17, 2015) (signed by Spain and Portugal only, see ICCS
Conventions: State of Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions as at 15 June 2014,
http://ciecLorg/SignatRatifConv.pdf [http://perma.cc/3ECG-GTZA] (archived Feb. 17,
2015)). Note that the stability and clarity of this mechanism entails rejection of renvoi,
which would be in accordance with the tendency manifested in Article 15 of the EC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1980) and some
national arrangements. See Erwin Spiro, The Proper Law of the Contract and Renvoi:
Further Comments on the Amin Rasheed Shipping Case, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 199,
199-200 (1984).
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In Cases Where the Contract is Only Implied (at Best)

"Marriage alternative" ASRs are sometimes not contracted in a
formal manner, even though they enjoy the protection of the law as
an implied contract. These relationships are a pure product of the
law, as often times the parties do not even consciously act toward
creating the relationship or even acknowledge its creation. Such is
the Israeli Reputed Couples arrangement which creates a marriagelike set of rights with the parties doing no more than merely having a
relationship.99 When considering such relationships, it is obvious that
the law creating the relationship should be the law governing it
elsewhere, as this law would be the basis for the parties' possible
reliance on the relationship, thus making its application justifiable.
Alongside this informal relationship-creating process, parties
may also create contracts and agree on the terms of their
relationships. Parties might see it fit to address choice of law
considerations, though this is not very likely. When the parties have
consciously consented to be in a relationship according to a given law,
there should be no problem (except for, maybe, public policy which
will be discussed below) to grant them rights based on that law and
on their contract under that law. However, these rights would be to
include only inter-spousal ones, as rights against the state would only
be created by the procedure designated and recognized by the country
bestowing the rights. The situation would be the same in cases where
the parties did not actively create a contract but had an implied
accord regarding the relationship. Naturally, in most cases of
conflicts between the parties, this alleged consensus would be
disputed, but courts are used to dealing with such disputes.
The proper law, once identified, applies also to the creation of the
contract. Therefore, it would also be used to decide if there is a
contract at all. When searching for the proper law of the contact, the
court will assess the connection between the relationship and
different laws. These connections include those the parties argue for,
alongside other links revealed in the facts of the case. When weighing
these connections, the nationality, domicile, or habitual affiliations of
the parties may regain relevance and play a role, since it may be
assumed that the parties' actions correspond with the law(s) with
which they are most familiar. Factual circumstances, such as
whether the previous behavior of the parties demonstrated reliance
on a specific law (and on the said relationship), may also be
considered. The result will be that the existence of the relationship
would be deemed under the law put forth by the parties or by

99.
The parties are only required to have family life and a shared household for
an undefined period of time. See, e.g., CA 621/69 Nassis v. Juster 24 SC 617, 619 [1970]
(Isr.); see also Lifshitz, External Rights, supra note 23, at 346, 387 (regarding the
indeterminate amount of time required).
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another, more fitting, law. Naturally, this procedure is long,
complicated, costly, and more than all-unstable and uncertain, but
such are the perils of informal and implied relationships. When
comparing it to the alternatives, this procedure at least has the
benefit of affording the relationship some cross-border protection.
Whether the parties have an actual contract or not, applying the
law under which the relationship was created has the benefit of
circumventing the "translation" question. That is due to the fact that
recognition under this mechanism does not immerse the relationship
in the lex fori or any other law that is foreign to the original
relationship but rather preserves it subjected to the original lex
contractus. So when considering recognition, a court does not have to
sort out ways to fit the relationship into the local legal structures but
is able to recognize, regulate, and maintain it under the law in which
the relationship is known and accurately defined. Consequently, this
mechanism not only solves the issue of translation between different
systems that use the same title (e.g., "domestic partnership," "civil
union," etc.) for relationships which are actually different, but it also
addresses the difficulty arising in courtiers where such relationships
simply do not exist. Applying the original law of the relationship
practically deems the law of the recognizing country irrelevant and
allows diverse outcomes, that is various foreign ASRs and their
specifications, to coexist.
C. Is Public Policy an Inevitable Barrier?
Another benefit of the contractual framing of the issue has to do
with public policy objections. The basic premise is that a state's
legitimacy to criticize a foreign action, by refusing to recognize it, is
limited to extreme cases. 100 A country may invoke public policy
objections and withhold recognition from a foreign relationship that is
manifestly opposed to the fundamental norms of the forum. 101

100.
See DICEY (15th ed.), supra note 50, at 1871, ¶¶ 32-182; KOPPELMAN,
DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 16, at 22 ("[C]ourts should not refuse to entertain a
foreign cause of action unless application of the foreign law 'would violate some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deeprooted tradition of the common weal."' (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y.
99, 111 (1918))); Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, "PublicPolicy" in the Conflict
of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 970 (1956) (noting that, under the Restatement
(Second) of the Conflict of Laws, small differences in the laws of two states is not
sufficient for one state to reject the other state's law on public policy grounds).
Koppelman views the rationale for the public policy exception as particularly
repugnant "because it extends to transactions with which the forum has no connection
other than the accident of being the place of the trial." KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES,
supra note 16, at 25 (footnote omitted).
101.
See supra note 100; see also Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906, 909 (Cal.
1961) ("[T]he California statute of frauds, in the absence of a plain legislative direction
to the contrary, could not reasonably be interpreted as applying to the contract [made
in Nevada] even though [the deceased] subsequently moved to California and died
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However, countries are expected to not object to foreign actions just
because they are different than the local actions and laws.10 2 This
appears to be particularly true for systems that have already allowed
deviation from traditional marriage and introduced some alternative
relationship in their law and so should not insist on the terms of this
deviation. That is to say that a country that has already broken away
from the traditional status-based marriage has less of a justifiable
objection to ASRs, since it has already loosened its grip on spousal
relationships. 103 When addressing ASRs as a public status-like
relationship, they may easily trigger such fundamental objections. 104
Applying a contractual mechanism to ASRs expropriates the
discussion, to a great extent, from the public sphere. There may still
be public policy objections in the private contractual sphere, but
private matters are less offensive to public policy in most cases.
Characterizing ASRs as contractual is preferable not only from a
theoretical point of view. Once relationships are defined as private
contractual matters rather than public status-related matters, they
are considered to be of less importance and influence, and therefore,
less interest to the public, 0 5 though the public may still be interested
in contracts. Yet, its interest in them is less entwined in their each
and every aspect. In this regard, contracts are different from matters
of status, where the public intervention is extensive. 0 6 This shifts the
main focus of the relationship from the public to the personal by
here. The basic policy of upholding the expectations of the parties by enforcing
contracts valid under the only law apparently applicable would preclude an
interpretation of our statute of frauds that would make it apply to and thus invalidate
the contract because [the deceased] moved to California an died here." (citation
omitted)).
102.
See generally supra note 100. Furthermore, a local action is not expected to
take foreign laws into account. See, e.g., Bernkrant, 360 P.2d at 909-10 ("Protection of
rights growing out of valid contracts precludes interpreting the general language of the
statute of frauds to destroy such rights whether the possible applicability of the statute
arises from the movement of one or more of the parties across state lines or subsequent
enactment of the statute.").
103.
That is to say that if a country has allowed any ASRs at all, it should be
open to ASRs that are different in details. When the difference is only in details, there
is an expectation that the country only object when it has a particularly good reason to
do so. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 48-49.
104.
Though this argument seems rather intuitive, some have doubted it. See,
e.g., Martina Melcher, Private InternationalLaw and Registered Relationships: An EU
Perspective, 20 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 1075, 1084 ("[I]t is not obvious in how far the
application of foreign substantive provisions on registered relationships in cross-border
cases poses a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to that domestic concept.").
105.
Though contractual matters are not necessarily un-interesting to those
engaged in public policy debates. Contracts of slavery or for prostitution or for abuse of
children would of course be a matter for public policy. See infra note 125.
106.
For example, it is hard to see how a particular division of assets between
ex-spouses would be seriously defined as a matter of public policy. But see infra note
115. However, when marriage was a pure matter of status, the public intervention was
not limited to preventing grave breaches on indispensable norms. The whole notion of
status is a creation of law, as opposed to the contractual creation of the parties' free
will.
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defining it as a private contract rather than a state-governed
status.10 7 Focusing on the outcomes of the relationship and not on the
relationship itself (thus, seeing ASRs as a contract regulating a
bundle of monetary and other rights rather than as creating a "brand
name" relationship of which right are resulting) takes ASRs even
further out of the reach of public policy.10 8 Public policy is relative: a
country is likely to conceptualize some relationships as a threat to its
morals and norms, but it may be less prone to feel threatened when it
is not asked to give the relationship any public recognition besides
that given by its courts when upholding the interpersonal obligations
derived from that relationship.10 9 The possible loss of some symbolic
declaratory value of the relationship caused by this characterization
is, of course, a cost. The loss of some public benefits such as taxation
and immigration benefits (the first and fourth claims in the analysis
suggested above) is also a cost, due to the fact that only the country
where the relationship was created is party to the contract and could
be obligated by it. However, this cost is more bearable than a
complete disregard of the relationship.
This is not to say that public policy has nothing to do with
contract-based ASRs but that it is easier to avoid a head-on collision
when using contractual
formulation. Though privatizing a
relationship makes it less of a public affair, it does not mean that the
public may have no objections whatsoever or that countries may not
object to legal outcomes just because they are contractually
construed. For example, a U.S. state that legislated a "mini-DOMA"
barring same-sex relationships from any protection, thus manifesting
a strong public policy objection to such relationships,11 0 would still be
unwilling to recognize a same-sex marriage and would have all the
necessary legal grounds to deny any recognition and protection of the

107.
An argument was made that "if a ...
right is one that the parties could
have contracted" for, then the recognizing country has no coherent public policy
argument to justify withholding that benefit. See Andrew Koppelman, Recognition and
Enforcement of Same-Sex Marriage Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriagesand
Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2158 (2005) [hereinafter
Koppelman, Interstate Recognition]. However, this argument, satisfying the parties
with a "could have" implied contract, has been justly criticized because "in the absence
of a contract, the parties are relying upon the state to create their rights, and it is the
state's prerogative whether to do so." Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage:Refining
the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195, 2212 (2005).
108.
Being legal effects of a foreign matter. See Goldstein, supra note 73, at 48.
109.
As a matter of relative public policy, courts would not support an evading
party, thus they would uphold the relationship in the context of the case at hand,
though in a different constellation of the same case, the court might not have
recognized the relationship. See Hans Verheul, Public Policy and Relativity, 26 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 109, 110-11 (1979) (discussing the case of the administration of a
deceased Nigerian's estate amongst his nine wives under English law, despite English
law's disavowal of the institution of polygamous marriage).
110.
See Silberman, supra note 107, at 2210.

2015]

WHAT DO YOU DO WHEN THEY DON'T SAY "I DO'?

461

relationship. "n Such objections, though not to be taken lightly, are
more limited as the claim made in a privatized relationship and in
recognition of rights only is more modest. That is particularly true
since most states would be willing to allow some spousal rights
between such couples through non-marital relationships. Only in
states that deny all spousal benefits resulting from such relationships
would public policy overcome the privatization of the relationship. 112
Even so, the contractual formulation would benefit people in
cases where the issue is not public policy but lack of legislation. That
is, cases of courts in countries which do not object to ASRs as such
but simply do not have them-in general or, what is more likely, a
certain kind of them in particular-in their laws.

V. APPLICATION:

THE SUGGESTED SOLUTION MEETS

LOCAL POLICIES

By and large, countries may be divided into two groups: those
who support ASRs or do not object to them and those who oppose
particular ASRs or ASRs in general. While the challenge posed by the
first group of countries is mainly a technical one-how the
relationships will be recognized-the second group poses a more
value-oriented question: what, if at all, could be recognized and under
what terms. The following applies the proposed solution to both types
of countries.
A. Countries Supporting or Not Objecting to ASRs
As mentioned, there are several types of ASRs: "marriage, but,"
"marriage-like," and "marriage alternative." These three groups
include various arrangements, such as "domestic partnerships," "civil

111.
See, e.g., Nat'1 Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524,
552 (Mich. 2008) (finding that article 1, § 25 of Michigan's constitution was valid and
prevented the provision of health benefits to same-sex domestic partners by public
employers).
112.
In some cases, even such express objections may not suffice as justification
for withholding recognition of such relationships based on public policy. Some lower
federal courts have recently started questioning this assumption, ruling that the
enactment of such provisions does not create a prevailing public policy barring the
creation or recognition of such relationships, based on (sometimes very narrow)
constitutional reasoning. See, e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549-57
(W.D. Ky. 2014), rev'd, Deboer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
Bourke v. Beshear, 2015 U.S. Lexis 620, 83 U.S.L.W. 3608 (Jan. 16, 2015); Deboer v.
Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768-75 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev'd, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir.
2014), cert. granted, 2015 U.S. Lexis 624, 83 U.S.L.W. 3608 (Jan. 16, 2015); Kitchen v.
Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1196-1216 (D. Utah 2013), affd, No. 13-4178, 2014 WL
2868044 (10th Cir. 2014); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 977-98 (S.D.
Ohio 2013), rev'd, Deboer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted 2015
U.S. LEXIS 618, 83 U.S.L.W. 3607 (Jan. 16, 2015); Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759,
767-72 (M.D. Tenn. 2014), rev'd, Deboer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
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unions," "cohabitations," and other country-specific mechanisms
offered by different laws around the world. It is assumed that all
countries suggesting such mechanisms in their laws do not, in
principle, object to ASRs. However, it is granted that they may not
see eye to eye with regard to the terms of the relationships or to the
kinds of ASRs to which they are open. When describing the problem
caused by the lack of conflicts rules for ASRs, one of the most difficult
problems was identified as the problem of "translation." Assume that
a couple in a Dutch civil union moves from the Netherlands to
France. Both these countries have civil unions in their laws.
However, in the Dutch relationship the couple had familial relations,
while the French Pacte Civil de Solidaritg ("PaCS") is clearly
designated to evade the creation of such relations,113 resulting in a
relationship that is manifestly and intentionally different from
marriage." 4 Using the seemingly fitting marital rules in such a case
would entail a translation of the Dutch relationship to the French
norms, thus losing the familial component of the relationship
together with other benefits attached to that relationship,
particularly with regard to rights following its dissolution. 1 5 On the
other hand, under the suggested solution the French court would not
have to align the relationship with the norms of the French ASR, as
the relationship would still be the Dutch one upon which the parties
agreed, with every benefit and disadvantage it previously had.
French courts would afford them any relief needed to sustain the
relationship as long as it does not offend French public policy.
The same would be the case had this Dutch relationship "visited"
Portugal. Portugal does not address civil unions in its laws; however,
it does regulate a similar arrangement, a domestic partnership.
Translating the Dutch relationship into Portuguese norms would be a
mighty challenge, the outcome of which is not at all clear. But under
the suggested mechanism, it does not matter that Portugal does not
have civil unions in its law. All Portugal is asked to do is uphold a
foreign relationship through contractual rules, not to immerse this
relationship into Portuguese legal norms. In other words, Portugal
would not recognize a relationship but rather enforce a contract.

113.
See Daniel Borrillo, The "Pacte Civil de Solidaritd" in France: Midway
between Marriage and Cohabitation, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 4, at 475, 475-76, 481-87; see also supra note 69 (providing examples of
downgrading mechanisms).
114.
See Swennen & Eggermont, supra note 17, at 30-33 (suggesting that the
French PaCS was designed to provide "some legal protection for same-sex couples,
without 'endangering' marriage" (footnote omitted)).
115.
See id. at 30, 36 (noting the differences in dissolving a registered
partnership in the Netherlands and France). ASRs also vary in more mundane aspects:
some relationships include a spousal property regime, support duties, and inheritance
rights while others do not. In such cases, the translation of the foreign relationship to
different local norms would fundamentally change the relationship and commitments.
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In both of these examples, the contractual characterization of the
relationship does not grant it all-inclusive international protection.
Any country may object to the recognition and execution of a contract
within its territory or by its courts based on public policy arguments.
So, if the relationship in question is, for some reason, in clear
contradiction to the forum's norms, the forum may withhold
recognition. This may be the case if the recognized relationship were
the Brazilian Unido Estdvel, which can be devised as a multi-lateral
relationship,' 1 6 as opposed to the common bilateral perception of such
relationships. In a case where a trio seeks recognition of their
relationship in another country, that country may think that this
relationship, under its terms in the country of origin, is not
acceptable and rule accordingly. This does not, in any way, differ from
the regular contractual rule, nor does it put ASRs or even this
particular ASR in an unusual risk. On the contrary, if anything, the
contractual understanding of ASRs gives this relationship a better
chance for recognition and execution (as a contract and not a
"relationship") throughout the world.
B. Countries Objecting to ParticularASRs or Aspects Thereof
1.

Case-Specific Objections

Some ASRs are different from others not simply in detail, but in
principle. Such is the case of the Belgian CohabitationLigal, which is
possible not only between people who may be (sexual) spouses but
also between immediate family members who are expected to create
different (that is, other than sexual) types of communal
relationships. 11 Other countries strongly object to such use of
ASRs,1 18 though not to the ASR itself nor to the mere existence of

116.
Though not clearly permitted by legislation, such a relationship was
granted recognition by a SSio Paulo public notary in 2012. See Yamiche Alcindor, ThreeWay Civil Union in Brazil Sparks Controversy, USA TODAY (Sept. 1, 2012, 11:39 AM),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2012/09/three-way-civil-union-inbrazil-sparks-controversy/1#.UwPBUaXfskk [http://perma.cc/T4J7-WF5F] (archived Jan.
26, 2015); Three-Person Civil Union Sparks Controversy in Brazil, BBC NEWS (Aug. 28,
2012, 2:08 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19402508 [http://perma.ccl
MXH2-G9JQ] (archived Feb. 3, 2015).
117.
See Swennen & Eggermont, supra note 17, at 34 ("[I]n Belgium ...
the
legal impediments to marriage between family members do not apply to registered
partners."). Despite the expectation for a non-romantic nature in such familial
relationships, this Belgian arrangement is only open to couples, thus a group of three
siblings, for example, could not create this relationship. See id.
118.
The parties may nonetheless continue their de-facto relationship without
the interference of most Western countries, though some would in fact intervene. See,
e.g., Stiibing v. Germany, App. No. 43547/08, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 63-67, available at
HUDOC, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110314 (Apr. 12, 2012)
(deciding that the applicant's criminal conviction permissibly interfered with the right
for respect of his private life, which includes his sexual life).
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relationship between the parties (as is the objection to the Brazilian
possibility mentioned above). An example for similar thinking is the
Burden case,119 where the English court was unwilling to recognize
the long-lasting, stable relationship between two sisters as creating a
civil partnership for the purpose of a tax exemption. 1 20 This decision
did not ban English civil partnership in general, as the court did not
try to strike down a part of its own law, but it refused to interpret the
relationship as extending to immediate family members. Similarly, it
may be assumed that, when a couple tries to assert rights based on a
foreign relationship which is legitimate and available in the forum
but not to people such as this couple (i.e., when a same-sex couple
tries to enter marriage or when a heterosexual couple tries to be
recognized as domestic partners in Germany), most countries would
not generally object to recognizing the relationship. Objections may
be expected only in cases where the parties are of extreme affinity, if
such affinity transgresses on the public policy of the forum.
The contractual mechanism and the constant subjection of ASR
to their original law may mitigate the tension created by
disagreement regarding the nature of the relationship, as it leaves
the relationship in its entirety-existence, nature, and outcomesunder one law which is presumed to have made the necessary
adjustments to accommodate any special characteristics it has
attributed to the relationship. 121 Further, it mitigates the imposition
caused to the forum by circumventing the need for the forum to
accommodate a concept to which it objects. This notwithstanding, the
long-term hosting of a foreign relationship is not without its
problems. One notable concern is that the foreign relationship would
be an artificial shield that would allow a couple to burden the local
court with foreign law and policy. However, since the relationship is a
foreign contact, that should make no difference. A country may decide
that a relationship existing within the territory is in fact an evasion
of its public policy since it forces it to deal with a concept it finds

119.
See Burden v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R.,
58-66, available at HUDOC, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-00178427 (Dec. 12, 2006).
120.
See id. Note that this was a local English case, thus a case where an ASR is
not supposed to lose its public rights, as the state of origin was the state of which the
benefit was asked.
121.
Another outcome of the foreign nature of the relationship is that the
dissolution of the relationship may be done by any court, see, for example, Carruthers,
supra note 97, at 9-10, with the exception of "marriage, but" arrangements, which are
considered by some countries as full-fledged marriages, and as such, part of one's
"status." Dissolving a marriage with contractual tools may result in subsequent
bigamy. Therefore, it is suggested that though the dissolution of such relationships
would still be subjected to the law under which the relationship was contracted, only a
country that would have had the jurisdiction to render a divorce would be authorized to
discuss this dissolution. A country that is able to acquire divorce jurisdiction is a
country that the rest of the world would follow when discussing the parties' capacity to
enter subsequent marriages.
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unacceptable. This would indeed force the parties to readjust the
relationship to local norms or move away, but it is the same case with
any contractual public policy case. This is still a better-off outcome, as
using contractual conceptualization frees parties from the control of
their personal law, allowing them to create desired relationships else
where. At the same time, this allows countries to safeguard their
preferences and only accommodate in their territory relationships
they find acceptable.
Furthermore, even in cases where the forum would still find the
recognition of this foreign relationship to be unacceptable, this would
not necessarily be the end for the ASR in question. Courts might be
willing to grant some rights resulting from the relationship using the
blue pencil doctrine to rectify the contract. 122 By doing so, it may
choose to allow the parties' previously acquired property, medical
decision-making, or wrongful death suit rights, all while withholding
general recognition of the relationship. 123 Since the relationship
would remain foreign, the couple would also have no claim for public
rights and benefits given to local ASRs, such as tax exemptions. But,
the destination country may be willing to equate the foreign ASR to
the local one for the purpose of such benefits on its own initiative.
These benefits, if not given to foreign ASRs, may also incentivize the
couple to re-formalize their relationship using a local ASR
arrangement. 124
This does not address all of the couple's needs. First and
foremost, the couple might not be recognized as a couple in the forum,
and one or both of the spouses would have to argue separately for
each and every right, proving it does not manifestly contradict the
public policy of the forum. Further, the couple or a spouse may have
to deal with the fact that future rights would not be recognized, and
so, the spouses will not be able to continue their legal relationship
(i.e., the acquisition of legal rights) whilst in the forum. However, the
outcome is not only still much improved in comparison to the existing
situation, it also enables a more limited application of public policy
through the contractual rule and, in any case, does not yield a worse

122.
See Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument
for Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 681-88 (2008) (defining
the blue pencil doctrine and explaining three approaches courts take when applying
the blue pencil doctrine).
123.
Some courts, such as Israel, already took this approach in dealing with
polygamy. See FAR 7252/15 Estate of John Doe v. Jane Doe [15.12.2014] (Isr.). This was
also the English approach when dealing with cross-border polygamy cases. See infra
note 125.
124.
Similar to the internal affairs doctrine in corporate choice of law, which
demands a corporation to reincorporate in order to change its internal rights or status
while allowing the corporation to conduct any other activity everywhere in the world.
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outcome than the one which achieved by the traditional status-based
rules in common law.' 25
2.

Group-Based Objections

Another kind of objection, similar to the first one but more
general, addresses the group affiliations of the parties instead of their
specific details and relations. The obvious case is that of homosexual
relationships. Some countries are unwilling to grant any recognition
to such relationships. Such, for example, is the case of Greece. 1 26
There may also be other, more localized, group-based objections.
Germany, for example, excludes heterosexual couples from ASRs, due
to the importance it attributes to marriage and its objection to the
dilution of marriage by extensive use of ASRs.1 27 So while Germany
does have an ASR concept in its law and is generally open to various
spousal relationships, it might withhold recognition when the
applying couple is a heterosexual one. Both of these objections are
matters of principle, but they are different in reasoning: while
Germany objects to the undermining of heterosexual relationships,
Greece opposes the homosexual relationship itself.
a.

Objection to the Undermining of an Important Relationship
("German" Objections)

When a country opposes ASRs because it views them as
"downgrading" an otherwise prominent relationship, it does not
oppose the relationship itself but rather its insufficient manifestation.
Therefore, while the country may limit the recognition of the

125.
The paradigmatic public-policy challenging marriage is that of potentially
polygamous marriages, that is a marriage under a law where one spouse is allowed to
take more than one spouse, though the specific spouse before the court opted out of that
possibility. In traditional common law, such marriages would not have been considered
a marriage and so the spouses were denied any matrimonial relief. See, e.g., Hyde v.
Hyde, [1866] 1 L.R. 130 (Eng.). English law later deviated from this rule by enacting
the Matrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act 1972, so that nowadays
potentially "polygamous marriages are recognised for most purposes." DICEY (15th ed.),
supra note 50, at 965-66, ¶ 17-139. Though polygamous marriages are not discussed in
this Article, they may also benefit from application of the contractual mechanism
suggested here on the private aspects of the relationship.
126.
Not only does Greece forbid same-sex marriages, it also bars homosexual
couples from entering civil partnerships despite ECHR finding this practice
discriminatory. See Vallianatos v. Greece, App. Nos. 29381/09, 32684/09, 2013 Eur. Ct.
H.R., ¶¶ 76-79, 92, available at HUDOC, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-128294 (Nov. 17, 2013); see also Paul Johnson, Vallianatos
Judgment on Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Civil Partnerships, ECHR BLOG
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/vallianatos-judgment-on-sexual.html
[http://perma.cc/CP3B-AALR] (archived Jan. 16, 2015) (discussing the decision in
Vallianatos).
127.
See Swennen & Eggermont, supra note 17, at 25; Martiny, supra note 65, at
189-90.
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relationship, it will probably not have a sound objection to allocating
contractual rights between the parties. It appears that Germany
would find it hard to base a public policy argument against granting a
share of the communal property or demanding an orderly dissolution
of the relationship just because the relationship is regulated in a way
that Germany considers to be not serious enough or insufficiently
projecting the importance of the union.
b.

Objection to the Overrating or
Relationship ("Greek" Objections)

Mere

Recognition

of

a

The objection of a country to an ASR due to the "overrating" of a
relationship is a deep one. This objection is farther-reaching than the
above-mentioned "German" objection, as it undoubtedly does indeed
intend to withhold rights resulting from the relationship. The Greek
argument against the contract is different than the German one, as
Germany's argument refers only to the "label" attached to the
relationship (ASR instead of marriage) while the Greek objection is to
the actual relationship, either in its current form or in general.
Greece may easily characterize a contract creating a spousal
relationship between two men to be manifestly contradictory to its
public policy, and, while in some countries such a characterization
may be debatable, it would be hard to argue against it in an Orthodox
Christian country. This objection would extend to the granting of any
right that may imply the existence or validity of the relationship.
Even when a couple is met with this kind of approach, the use of
a contractual definition may ease their lot. While Greece would
clearly oppose any public or formalized component of the relationship,
and so is likely to object any status-based recognition, it may be
willing to grant some rights as a result of a private accord between
the parties. Moreover, even a country that not only bans certain
relationships from any public formalization but also bans them from
existing (as is still the case in quite a few countries regarding
homosexual relationships) 128 may still be willing to consider specific
rights in extreme circumstances such as medical decision making' 2 9

128.
See generally LUCAS PAOLI ITABORAHY & JINGSHU ZHU, INT'L LESBIAN GAY
BISEXUAL TRANS & INTERSEX AsS'N [ILGA], STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD
SURVEY OF LAWS: CRIMINALISATION, PROTECTION AND RECONGITION OF SAME-SEX LOVE

(8th ed. 2013), available at http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA.StateSponsored
Homophobia_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/QKN4-NRAS] (archived Jan. 26, 2015) (listing
a number of nations and entities categorically banning the existence of certain types of
relationships).
129.
See Silberman, supra note 107, at 2209-10 ("A prohibition on same-sex
marriage-even one expressed in legislation-does not necessarily mean that all
economic benefits should be denied. Interestingly, polls have shown that while a
substantial majority of the public rejects the idea of same-sex marriage, a narrow
majority also believes that same-sex couples should receive equal treatment with
respect to economic rights." (footnotes omitted)). Such cases do exist. For example,
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and other short-term rights of that sort13 0 as a humanitarian gesture,
particularly in cases where there is no acceptable alternative decision
maker. 131 This very minimal acknowledgement of the parties'
agreements could somewhat mitigate the risk to such couples,
without directly infringing on the forum's policies and preferences. 3 2

VI. CONCLUSION

ASRs are a relatively new way to live as a couple and could
promote autonomy and create meaningful and accurate relationships.
Unlike marriage, ASRs are not standardized. They vary in existence
and terms between jurisdictions. The potential social importance of
ASRs require that legislators and scholars give proper attention to
the overall function of these relationships, adding regulation where
needed. The cross-border side of these relationships is clearly lacking,
and the solution suggested in this Article may help better the
situation.
The proposed solution is not perfect, it may be rejected by some
(though probably not many) jurisdictions based on justified public
policy arguments, and it does not transform the relationship as a
whole, only the private aspects of it. However, this last disadvantage
is an advantage in a world where there is disagreement regarding
legitimate and illegitimate ASRs. It allows focusing and basing the
solution solely on justice between the parties, thus limiting the public
Mississippi, which banned inter-racial marriages, was willing to grant inheritance
rights as this would not force the relationship itself on it. See KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT
STATES, supra note 16, 39-42 (giving several examples of this phenomenon, including
this Mississippi case). Furthermore, in this context it may be helpful to discuss the
connections of the parties to the country asked to recognize the relationship: does the
couple live in the country and just left briefly to create a forbidden relationship in a
place where it is possible or are they guests only passing through or even arriving
accidently to the country. See Koppelman, Interstate Recognition, supra note 107,
at 2152-63 (discussing four types of marriages: evasive, migratory, visiting, and
extraterritorial); KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 16, at 101-13 (exploring
the categories of "evasive, migratory," and "visitor" marriages).
Medical decision making is rather unique in two aspects. On the one hand,
130.
allowing one's loved one to make a decision for him or her could be easily characterized
as a fundamental humanitarian issue not of love (relationship-related matter) but of
life (autonomy-related matter). On the other hand, such rights are semi-public as they
aim to bind a third party-the hospital. Therefore, parties would be wise to create a
durable power of attorney, separate from the ASR contract, which would be more easily
accepted by reluctant third parties.
131.
Note that if the recognition is limited to humanitarian bases and is not
recognized as a binding contract that grants the parties rights and privileges, any
immediate family member's decision would trump that of the spouse.
Koppelman dismisses this opposition by arguing, "[t]he clause referring to
132.
'contractual rights' makes little sense. Rights that arise by virtue of a marriage . .. are
not contractual rights." KOPPELMAN, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 16, at 142. But
formulating the relationship as a contract as suggested here directly exposes the
relationship to this kind of objection, allowing opposing states to withhold recognition.
This could be helped not by choice of law tools, but only by political ones.
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policy objections and allowing recognition of what seems to be the
most important part of the relationship and also the majority of
rights in most cases. By doing so, this solution promotes fairness,
clarity, and stability, thus making a small contribution to the
protection of parties in such relationships. It also fits the general
tendency of family law toward contractual rather than statusoriented thinking, thus promoting correlation between the
substantive law and the choice of law on this matter.

